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Do Allies Really Free Ride? 
Forthcoming in Survival*  
Alexander Lanoszka† 
lanoszka@mit.edu 
 
American decision-makers and security analysts often lament how allies often ‘free ride’ 
on the United States. In 2011, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates spoke of how 
“nations  [are] apparently willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume the 
growing security burden left by reductions in European defense budgets.” He warned of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) “dismal future” if European allies do 
not contribute their fair share. After all, in 2014, the majority of European members of 
NATO spent less than two percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on their 
militaries. By contrast, the United States spent about four percent. And indeed, Gate’s 
remarks resonate with some American politicians, pundits, and even prominent realist 
international security experts who describe allies as free riders when justifying their calls 
for the United States to revoke its military commitments abroad.1 As the argument goes, 
if European allies were to stop free riding and improve their collective defense, then 
transatlantic security will increase and the United States can reduce its global footprint.  
 Charges of free riding are commonplace in contemporary alliance politics. 
Nevertheless, it is unclear what exactly free riding means. Intuitively, free riding refers to 
how some states do not contribute any share at all to the common good that benefits them. 
                                                        
* NOTE: This version is not final and does not feature important revisions and updates that appear in the 
final publication. † Alexander Lanoszka is the 2014-2015 Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology. He received his PhD at Princeton University in 2014. He can be reached at 
lanoszka@mit.edu.  
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Yet allies always spend some amount on defense, thereby making this stringent definition 
useless. Another view holds that free riding occurs when states fail to contribute their fair 
share to the common defense. Free riders provide less than they could in proportion to 
their wealth, preferring instead to rely on the efforts of others so as to reap the same 
benefits but at lower expense. However, this rule for judging whether a state free rides 
does not seem to be used in practice. Take, for example, President Dwight Eisenhower’s 
own grievances in the 1950s that European allies did not do enough for their own defense. 
Yet he himself was unsure what free riding really meant, and what he would prefer allies 
to do other than acquiring their own independent nuclear arsenals.2 Allegations of free 
riding were a fixture in Congressional debates towards the late 1980s but it was only in 
2006 did NATO adopt a precise standard when its members pledged to commit two 
percent of their GDP to defense.3 In the context of increasingly complex technology and 
rising weapons costs, even this standard seems arbitrary.4 
 Though it is important to develop a consistent threshold for free riding, a more 
pressing question remains: does free riding really happen so as to have important 
consequences for international security? For one, the idea that states would defer their 
core security interests to others contradicts a core axiom in international relations 
scholarship. Put simply, anarchy means states should never trust one another with 
something as important as defense, especially as violations of alliance commitments are 
widespread.5 Why would states free ride and thereby entrust others with their security 
given the risks involved? What then looks like free riding could in fact be the result of 
low threat assessments or some grand bargain with a superpower guarantor like the 
United States. For another, and here Eisenhower’s own uncertainty is instructive, it is 
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unclear what military benefit is lost if the contributions of weaker states cannot 
significantly alter the military balance and the collective defense of NATO relies on its 
nuclear deterrent.  
 Building on these observations, I argue that free riding is far less pervasive and 
problematic than assumed. I first elaborate on the supposed logic of free riding, that is, 
that allies might find it in their rational interest to contribute less than their fair share to 
collective defense. I demonstrate that, conceptually, such arguments have important 
weaknesses. However, it is not enough to highlight these weaknesses given the 
contemporary policy relevance of the ‘free riding’ slogan. Accordingly, I highlight how 
states during the Cold War were not tempted to free ride as a first resort in their defense 
policies. Indeed, if European allies appear to be free riding today, then it is because they 
struck a grand bargain with the United States during the Cold War for them not to acquire 
nuclear weapons. Finally, I address another concern about free riding that Gates’ remarks 
suggest: that consistently under-contributing to European defense reduces the capacity of 
allies to regenerate their security should the United States prove unwilling and unable to 
protect them. I show how Gates’ concern might be overblown: NATO members in 
Central-Eastern Europe are actively taking steps to arm and balance against Russia amid 
the Ukrainian crisis.  
Alliances and Free Riding  
An alliance is “a relationship between two or more states that involves mutual 
expectations of some degree of policy coordination on security issues under certain 
conditions in the future.”6 It represents an attempt at collective action intended to address 
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some type of security threat. Indeed, institutionalizing an alliance by shepherding its 
founding treaty through domestic ratification procedures has the benefit of making 
commitments to collective action credible.7 According to the rational choice perspective 
in economics and political science, individual actors face incentives to benefit from a 
collective action while passing onto others the costs incurred from contributing to that 
very action. Collective action should be implausible unless members have a strong stake 
in obtaining its benefits or avoiding the costs of violating commitments. Thus, alliances 
help solve collective action problems since states would need to damage their reputations 
severely should they decide not to fulfill their agreements.8 
Free riding represents a failure of collective action whereby the under-provision 
of a public good is suboptimal because free riders do not contribute to its production. 
When the common good is non-excludable and non-rival in consumption, as in the case 
of street lighting and clean air, free riding incentives exist. Although alliances are by their 
nature excludable and rival in consumption, and thus should not feature those incentives,9 
‘free riding allies’ remains a popular descriptor for some states. One possibility is that 
states might fail to mobilize during a military crisis, hoping to defer the costs of the 
conflict to allies (i.e. buckpassing).10 Alternatively, they might still contribute to a 
military campaign but place restrictions that limit their participation. Meanwhile, other 
countries exert greater effort at the cost of blood and treasure.11  
Though these situations might represent free riding, allegations of allies free 
riding often focus on defense contributions instead – an issue that this essay primarily 
addresses. Specifically, allies free ride when they do not contribute to the common 
defense burden proportionately to their capabilities. Just being in an alliance with a much 
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stronger country is not free riding. States must provide less than an equitable share 
because they prefer to defer the costs onto others while reaping the benefits of the 
collective good. One popular theory of alliances takes this argument further by 
emphasizing how the distribution of economic power within alliances affects patterns of 
state contributions to their collective defense. In a seminal study, Mancur Olson and 
Richard Zeckhauser find support for their proposition that larger allies bear 
disproportionately a greater share of the defense burden than their weaker counterparts.12 
Using cross-sectional data of NATO members in 1964, they show a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between GDP and the percentage of state resources 
devoted to the common defense. Some statistical tests corroborated these findings13 
whereas more have not.14  Despite the mixed evidence, assertions that free riding remain 
popular in discussions of American military commitments around the world.  
Yet the defense expenditure view of free riding stands uneasily alongside an 
axiom in international relations scholarship. That is, states cannot infer the intentions of 
others with certainty, making them cautious and even distrustful.15 Some realists add that 
the international system encourages self-help since states cannot rely on the kindness of 
others.16 States thus have to be mindful of their security in choosing their alignment 
options and armament policies. These choices face an important trade-off: alliances might 
help a state aggregate capabilities quicker but at the expense of uncertain support in 
future crises whereas armaments improve self-sufficiency but can be costly and slow to 
acquire.17 Consequently, states determine some mixture of alliances and armaments that 
maximize deterrence against an adversary at the lowest possible cost.   
Moreover, one assumption of economic theories of alliances is that the threat 
 6 
motivating the alliance in the first place uniformly affects each member. However, every 
state also has a different assessment of the threat posed by the adversary because of 
geography, power projection, and political preferences.18 It should be unsurprising that 
defense expenditures vary, even among allies.19 
Finally, because of their inherent vulnerability, weak states have the most to lose 
from over-relying on their major power ally. As the experience of Taiwan indicates, they 
are susceptible to deals made between their major power ally and their adversary at their 
expense. Only if the weak state believes its security and survival to be of vital interest to 
the stronger ally could real incentives to free ride exist. Still, even then the weak state is 
likely of vital interest to its stronger ally precisely because of some shared sense of threat 
emanating from an adversary. When threat perceptions are high, the weaker ally still has 
strong reasons not to depend parasitically on its guarantor. 
This last point suggests that free riding should occur when threat perceptions are 
low. Without a strong external threat, weaker states will be reluctant to commit to high 
levels of defense spending so as to enjoy a peace dividend. Therefore, they free ride on 
their major power allies whose interests are more far-reaching and merit continually high 
levels of military expenditures. However, a larger issue remains: why is equitable 
collective action necessary such that free riding matters and represents a valid concern? 
That is, why should there be collective action towards the production of a common good 
when the usefulness of that good is dubious? Alliance management could become a good 
onto itself, as was perhaps the case with the respect to NATO in the 1990s. But alliance 
management in a safe and peaceful environment should be relatively inexpensive: free 
riding should not matter even when it happens.20  
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We still must consider another, more practical issue. Simply because a weak state 
is free riding does not mean that the alliance will be more secure if it starts paying its ‘fair’ 
share. After all, the marginal contribution by a weak state will, by definition, be small 
and unlikely to tip meaningfully the balance of power, especially in the presence of 
nuclear weapons.  Indeed, the only truly effective deterrent that a weak state can acquire 
to defend against a conventionally superior (and nuclear-armed) adversary is a nuclear 
arsenal. This problem becomes more urgent for the weaker state once its guarantor and 
major power adversary acquire survivable second-strike capabilities. After all, armed 
conflict between these major powers should become less likely. The incentives to engage 
in even lower levels of conflict could wane because of concerns regarding nuclear 
escalation. Taking one step further, Robert Jervis argues that allies cease being important 
to the survival of major powers like the United States under such conditions. As such, 
free riding becomes a misplaced concern.21 An irony exists here: when states cease to 
matter to their stronger allies, they become more vulnerable to adversaries and thus have 
even less reason to free ride. It is thus an empirical question whether any decision of 
theirs to forego nuclear weapons reflects a choice to free ride on their alliances. 
In short, at least with regards to the defense expenditure view of free riding, the 
concerns raised by Robert Gates, realist security scholars, and retrenchment advocates 
may be overstated. By depending too much on others, a state makes itself vulnerable to 
its adversary and gambles on its allies not abandoning it in the future. Because of the high 
stakes involved in international politics, such a gamble is risky. Lastly, if weaker states 
were to contribute equitably to the effective deterrence of an adversary, then the marginal 
benefit of the additional armaments is ambiguous when the adversary has nuclear 
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weapons.  
Free Riding during the Cold War and Today 
Even if the theory is problematic, states could still free ride in a manner that justifies the 
worry. One useful way to evaluate the argument is to examine historical and 
contemporary evidence. Thankfully, complaints regarding free riding are not new – they 
date at least as far back as the Eisenhower administration – and have evolved up through 
today. Cold War history indicates that allies did not trust the United States enough to free 
ride on it as a first resort. They consequently tried to acquire nuclear weapons. At present, 
NATO members threatened by Russian behavior are arming themselves despite their 
alliance benefits. 
Western European Free Riding during the Cold War? 
Since NATO faced a conventionally superior Warsaw Pact, American Cold War strategy 
relied heavily on the nuclear threat. A nuclear first use posture was seen as an effective 
and relatively inexpensive means to deter Soviet aggression.22  
This strategy notwithstanding, American (and allied) troops were garrisoned on 
Western European territories, especially after the Korean War. They served to reassure 
NATO allies like West Germany that the United States would have ‘skin in the game’ 
should armed hostilities break out on the continent. Their role was at least as symbolic as 
military. Accordingly, Eisenhower regarded these forces as an economic burden on the 
United States and complained that the Europeans should develop their own conventional 
militaries so as to fill the role that American ground forces played. In November 1959, he 
 9 
lamented to members of the National Security Council that: 
“At present we are bearing a large share of the infra-structure cost, we are 
bearing almost all the cost of the deterrent, and we are maintaining a large 
navy to keep the seas free ... It was high time that the thinking of Europe 
was reoriented and made more realistic before the NATO situation is 
further crystallized; it was high time that the population of Europe did its 
part with respect to ground forces. However, the U.S. could not initiate a 
definite scheme for the reduction of U.S. forces, and in the absence of 
agreement by Europe, say this and only this is what we are going to do.”23  
Put differently, Eisenhower recognized that American interests to contain the Soviet 
Union and reassure its Western European allies created perverse incentives for free riding. 
Some statistical studies validate Eisenhower’s concerns that members of the Western 
alliance spent less than their fair share of their GDP on defense before the mid-1960s.24  
 Yet consider again American military strategy: to compensate for its conventional 
inferiority, it used the threat of nuclear weapons to deter Soviet aggression. Each Western 
European ally could apply the same logic so as to justify its own nuclear weapons 
program. To be sure, they could have collectively acquired enough conventional military 
power to reach parity with the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, even if they were to overcome 
the associated collective action problems, Soviet countermeasures would have likely 
negated such efforts. Notwithstanding the statistical evidence mentioned above, little 
compelling strategic rationale existed for the Europeans to abide by American wishes to 
commit to large conventional defense expenditures during this time.25 
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 Instead, European allies actively considered acquiring nuclear weapons. Already a 
lack of faith in American security guarantees partly drove British interest in acquiring a 
deliverable nuclear capability by the mid-1950s.26 Later that decade, West Germany, 
France, and Italy – the three strongest continental allies of the United States – entered 
into a trilateral initiative to produce a European nuclear capability.27 Each had its own 
reasons for doubting American guarantees. West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
worried that the United States would withdraw its ground forces and thus eliminate a 
symbol of the American commitment to continental security.28 French leaders understood 
the combination of the Suez Crisis and American unwillingness to use nuclear weapons 
in French Indochina as evidence of American perfidy.29 Italian leaders also did not wish 
to defer completely to the United States in a key part of alliance decision-making. 
Furthermore, nuclear weapons made sense when these allies were geographically closer 
to the Soviet Union than the United States, which had the ocean as a buffer. Accordingly, 
although French President Charles de Gaulle cancelled this initiative shortly after 
returning to power, European states still hedged on whether to acquire nuclear weapons 
throughout the 1960s. France ultimately went nuclear. Other allies, including West 
Germany, held out for nuclear-sharing arrangements that the Eisenhower administration 
(and later the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) promised so as to gain greater input 
in NATO nuclear decision-making.30 They used the threat of acquiring nuclear weapons 
to ensure American commitments to their security and even extract concessions regarding 
the design of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.31  
 Allies ultimately renounced nuclear weapons not because they wished to free ride, 
but because they struck a grand bargain with the United States. A growing body of 
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evidence suggests that the United States coerced its own allies to disavow independent 
nuclear arsenals.32 After all, the United States has a powerful motive for curbing the 
spread of nuclear weapons. These weapons limit its capacity to project power and 
manage its alliances. Therefore, United States mounted counterproliferation efforts to 
discourage its European and East Asian allies.33  
This observation raises an important question with respect to alliance politics. 
Often alliances are cast as mechanisms to aggregate capabilities in order to enhance 
deterrence.34 Free riding is a problem because it leads to the underproduction of these 
aggregate capabilities. Yet depriving allies of nuclear weapons works against the goal of 
capability aggregation. Thus, what might look like exploitative free riding is really the 
implementation of a grand bargain struck between the United States and its allies.   
One may argue that deterring the Soviet Union at the strategic (or tactical) nuclear 
level does not imply deterrence at lower levels of violence. Accordingly, Western 
European countries could have developed their own capabilities to reinforce these aspects 
of NATO defense. Some statistical work suggests that these allies did just that.35 Yet 
recall the point made earlier: once major powers acquire mutual second-strike capabilities, 
their allies might be more attentive to whether the adversary can threaten their interests in 
a way that does not directly threaten their stronger patron. Indeed, in the late 1970s when 
they had already made nonproliferation pledges, Western European countries found 
investments in Soviet conventional capabilities less alarming than upgrades to Soviet 
missile capabilities (e.g., the SS-20). They perceived a major gap in American extended 
nuclear deterrence and so wanted American middle-range missiles.36 These requests did 
not reflect a desire to free ride. The nuclear option at this point was closed to them given 
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their NPT commitments – something that the United States had wanted. Boosting 
conventional capabilities would have been inappropriate for negating advances in Soviet 
nuclear capabilities. 
Free Riding in Europe Today? 
Free riding concerns re-emerged following the end of the Cold War. European members 
of NATO seem not to have done their part for the alliance. The United States took the 
lead in the NATO air campaigns against Yugoslavia in 1999 and Libya in 2012. It – 
along with Canada and the United Kingdom – had also experienced difficulties in 
obtaining military support from NATO partners in the most dangerous parts of 
Afghanistan.37 The concerns over burden-sharing that emerged in these campaigns 
hadless to do with budgets and more to do military operations in peripheral regions – a 
reflection of how NATO has evolved after the Cold War.  
At a 2006 meeting, NATO members addressed the classic budgetary dimension of 
free riding and pledged to spend at least two percent of their GDPs. Ironically, fewer of 
them reached this target in 2014 than when they first made this commitment. But again, 
the absence of threat – rather than the exploitation of the benefits accrued from the 
contributions of others – can explain this tendency. Western Europe had faced no urgent 
international security threat to justify boosting defense expenditures. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union, and the accompanying geopolitical threat, enabled Western governments to 
justify reducing defense expenditures so as to increase funding to social programs. Even 
September 11, 2001 did not produce a call to arms, likely because Western European 
governments saw terrorism as an important criminal threat that prompted stronger law 
 13 
enforcement and policing rather than an international threat that necessitated a strong 
military response.38 Further, German politicians opposed American military action 
against Iraq whereas their French counterparts were more skeptical before finally 
opposing the invasion.39 More recently, the prolonged economic crisis afflicting members 
of the European Union would make any initiatives to increase defense expenditures 
domestically unpalatable in an era of austerity. It is hard to justify diverting money from 
domestic programs to boost military capabilities especially when clear military threats are 
absent. 
The security environment facing Europe changed dramatically over the course of 
2014. This change began with the collapse of the Yanukovych government in Ukraine 
and the subsequent takeover of Crimea by Russia. In response, NATO members in 
Central-Eastern Europe invoked Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Only invoked 
three times in the past (by Turkey in all instances), this article calls on NATO allies to 
consult each other “whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, 
political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” To reassure its 
allies and deter Russia, the United States organized joint military exercises and deployed 
small numbers of armed forces in Central-Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, Russia still 
provided (and continues to do so, as of March 2015) financial and military aid to 
Russian-friendly rebels fighting Ukrainian government forces in eastern Ukraine. 
Tougher European and American sanctions followed the killing of three hundred civilians 
in the shooting down of a civilian airliner over Ukrainian territory, likely by Russian-
backed rebels.40  
 Despite the recentness of these developments, it is worth pondering the extent to 
 14 
which allies have become so psychologically dependent on the United States so as to 
defer to it the costs of security despite this threat. Their desire to extract new security 
assurances and bolster existing alliance ties is apparent. Polish leaders have asked for the 
stationing of about ten thousand NATO troops on its territories. The Baltic countries have 
pleaded the United States to offer more military assistance.41  
One may thus interpret these pleas as indicating a desire to free ride on the United 
States. Indeed, it might be rational behavior to do so since these European allies do not, 
and could not, have the wherewithal to defend against Russia conventionally. To compare, 
Russia has almost 900,000 active troops whereas Poland has 100,000 and the Baltic 
countries each have somewhere between 5,000 to 12,000. Yet NATO on the aggregate 
spends about a trillion dollars on defense and the United States has over sixty thousand 
troops and nearly two hundred tactical nuclear weapons on the continent (mostly in 
Germany and Western Europe).42 Being in NATO, these European allies receive an 
Article 5 commitment whereby an attack against one member is an attack against all. 
Nevertheless, we already observe some form of balancing against Russia by these 
Central-Eastern European NATO members. Simply put, they are discounting the free ride 
available to them by depending less on the United States. Consider Poland, Germany, and 
the Baltic states in turn: 
Poland 
Poland joined NATO in 1999. At first glance, it appears to spend slightly below the 
minimum target of two percent set forward by NATO members in 2006. It spent 1.8 
percent of its GDP on its military in 2013. However, this number is expected to rise to 
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about 1.95 percent in 2014 (about 10.4 billion US dollars) to satisfy a Polish law to keep 
defense spending at least at that level.  Moreover, these numbers mask the military 
modernization program actively pursued by the Polish government. Indeed, total Polish 
defense spending has doubled since 2002. By 2022, an estimated 28 billion US dollars 
will be spent on acquiring new helicopters, maritime capabilities, and anti-missile and 
defense systems. Poland will thus have the most powerful ground force in Europe. These 
plans were already set before the Russian intervention in Crimea since the 2008 Russian 
war with Georgia heightened Polish threat perceptions but have since gained 
momentum.43 These initiatives include phasing out Soviet-era equipment and build on 
several modernization programs of the Poland Armed Forces that have involved 
acquiring 48 F-16 C/D aircraft; 14 C-295 transport aircraft; and anti-tank guided and 
naval strike missiles.44  
 Poland might be free riding ever so slightly if we are to adhere strictly according 
to the two percent standard, but its behavior suggests a desire for greater security self-
reliance. Named after the current Polish President, the so-called Komorowski Doctrine is 
the prevailing foreign policy vision in Poland today. It emphasizes homeland defense and 
improved military capabilities. This desire for autonomy is understandable given its 
history. The United Kingdom and France declared war on Nazi Germany following its 
invasion of Poland in September 1939, but did little more to relieve pressure on Poland. 
Despite Polish contributions to the allied war effort, the United States and the United 
Kingdom appeared to recognize Poland and much of Central-Eastern Europe as a Soviet 
sphere of influence. Free riding, therefore, entails too much trust that Polish leaders feel 
they can ill-afford.  
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 To be sure, Poland is unique amongst other members of the Visegrad Group in its 
desire to bolster regional security. Formed in 1991, this initiative involves Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. It aims partly to deepen military ties 
between them. The three other members of the Visegrad Group have shown a weaker 
desire to boost their militaries. Both Czech and Slovak leaders even rejected the idea that 
the United States should station its troops so as to bolster extended deterrence.45 Yet this 
reluctance to follow Poland’s example seems to reflect their lesser sense of the Russian 
threat and their desire to retain positive economic relations with Russia. Indeed, 
Hungarian President Viktor Orbán and his ruling party Jobbik are committed political 
allies to the Kremlin. Political preferences, and not the desire to exploit the contributions 
of other NATO members, shape their behavior.  
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
Having joined NATO in 2004, the three Baltic States are some of the smallest members 
of the alliance. Given their small size, they are most likely to contribute less than their 
proportional share to the overall defense burden. It is a rational course of action, in other 
words. Moreover, because of the relative smallness of the Baltic countries, not much 
deterrent value is gained from spending a more equitable portion on defense. Nor can 
they augment existing military capabilities that are essential for the alliance. The best 
deterrent they can acquire for preventing an attack on their territory would come from 
having their own nuclear weapons arsenals – something which even the United States 
would not accept.  Accordingly, NATO has asked the Baltic States to focus on 
emergency relief and cyber security rather than building large standing armies.46 NATO 
thus established a cyber defense center a few years after a major cyber attack, presumably 
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of Russian origin, against Estonia’s electronic infrastructure in spring 2007.47 By 
adhering to the two percent standard, they will improve only their denial capabilities and 
thus make it more difficult for Russia to invade their territories. Yet it is doubtful whether 
Russia would invade the territory of a state that can invoke Article 5 commitments under 
NATO when it had used more subversive techniques in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. 
 So what have they have done so far for their own defense? Their actual defense 
spending habits only fit this prediction ambiguously. Since joining NATO, Estonia has 
consistently spent about 2.4 percent of its GDP on its military. This proportion dropped in 
2011 below 2%, but only because it merged the Border Guard Service with the National 
Police. Latvia spent somewhere between 1.7 and 1.9 percent of its GDP on the military 
before 2009. Lithuania has spent an estimate 1.4 percent of the country despite being the 
biggest of the three Baltic countries. Both Latvia and Lithuania cut defense expenditures 
dramatically, however, in the wake of a major economic crisis that began in 2008 when 
local property markets collapsed. Because their economics experienced major contraction 
amid austerity policies, Latvia and Lithuania found themselves spending closer to one 
percent of their GDP on defense.48  
 The Russian intervention in Ukraine appears to be reversing these trends in their 
defense spending. The Baltic States are contiguous to Russia and only obtained their 
independence thanks to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Any military effort that 
undermines territorial integrity in the region is unsettling to them. Moreover, 
proclamations made by President Vladimir Putin to protect Russian-speaking populations 
are particularly unsettling for Estonia and Latvia because at least a quarter of their 
populations use Russian as a first language. Estonia will continue spending at least two 
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percent of its budget on the military whereas Latvia pledged to reach such levels by 2020. 
The Latvian defense minister has put forward a law to strengthen this pledge.49 Polls in 
March 2014 revealed a vast majority of Latvians want increases in military spending. 
Even Lithuania is seeking to double its defense spending so as to devote two percent of 
its GDP to the military. It will invest in air-defense systems and anti-tank rocket 
launching systems.50 To increase manpower, Lithuania even reintroduced conscription in 
February 2015, having abolished it before in 2008. Indeed, Lithuanian President Dalia 
Grybauskaite noted that the Baltic states need to be self-sufficient in repelling any 
invasion for “at least 72 hours” before NATO can provide help.51 
Germany 
No discussion of balancing in Central-Eastern European balancing against Russia can be 
complete without Germany, which consistently spends below levels requested by the 
United States. In 2012, it spent less than 1.5 percent on its military.52 Interestingly, 
despite being the fifth largest economy in the world, it is the seventh largest defense 
spender in the world. Nevertheless, it spends on the military disproportionately less than 
its economic power among NATO members. This under-spending is not accidental. It is 
the legacy of a grand bargain between the major powers, for the prospects of a rearmed 
(West) Germany unsettled allies (and especially adversaries) during the first half of the 
Cold War.53 Indeed, another legacy of this grand bargain is the continuing American 
military presence in West Germany. 
 Another oft-cited reason for German military stinginess is the anti-militarist 
culture that developed in West German society following greater awareness of the 
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international crimes committed by the Nazi regime.54 However, there are signs that anti-
militarism is weakening, especially in light of the crisis over Ukraine. Even before the 
Russian intervention in Crimea, German President Joachim Gauck has declared the need 
for the Bundeswehr to be accorded with greater respect in German society. In a speech 
given at a security conference in Munich in January 2014, he acknowledged Germany’s 
need for NATO and noted that Germany and its European allies should be more 
responsible for their security.55 In June 2014, he described the Bundeswehr as “not a 
limitation on liberty, but a pillar of [German] liberty” and so meriting “our confidence.”56 
He called on “greater active participation in conflict resolution” with other European 
Union and NATO members. Gauck’s role as president is largely ceremonial, but his 
remarks did provoke criticism from members of the German left.57  
 Gauck’s speech might only be a rhetorical blip in German defense policy, which 
admittedly remains unchanged since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis. Still, a series of 
well-publicized mishaps and logistical problems in 2014 revealed the sorry state of the 
German military.58 One silver lining in these tribulations is that there may now exist a 
greater willingness to discuss openly increasing Germany’s defense budget in a way that 
was not possible before. Already the Ministry of Defense is striving to repair Bundeswehr 
so as to make it a more attractive place for employment.59 A new White Paper is in the 
making that will reassess the Bundeswehr’s responsibilities and the capabilities needed 
for meeting them.60 Greater investment in it is necessary if Germany wishes to continue 
to operate in multiple overseas missions abroad as it has been in the past decade.61 
Accordingly, in March 2015, upon citing global instability, German Finance Minister 
Wolfgang Schäuble signaled that higher German defense spending is in the offing.62 The 
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Bundeswehr even activated a German tank battalion so as to bolster military cooperation 
with Polish, French, and Dutch armies.63 These steps towards greater defense 
expenditures may be small and hesitant, but such a pace should not be surprising given 
Germany’s experience with militarization.  
No welfare queens in international politics 
That allies exploit high American defense spending seems to be a popular slogan 
amongst American decision-makers, lawmakers, and even prominent realist scholars. Yet 
this slogan often serves a political end. Sometimes it is an exhortation to allies that they 
take seriously their own defense expenditures so as to complement (rather than substitute) 
American military power. Less innocuously, invocations of free riding allies help justify 
calls for the United States to reduce its role in the world by retracting military and 
political commitments to Europe and elsewhere. With fiscal and political pressures for 
retrenchment mounting, such invocations could resonate more loudly over the near term. 
 In light of these policy implications, this article challenges the widespread view 
that allies free ride. Certainly, the United States bears the greatest share of the defense 
burden when it comes to its own alliances. It spends more on defense as a percentage of 
GDP and offers nuclear security guarantees to European (and East Asian) allies. And so it 
might be in the rational interest of their allies to contribute less than their fair share 
towards their own collective defense. Nevertheless, what looks like free riding could be 
the result of low threat assessments rather than the opportunistic exploitation of high 
American defense spending. After the Cold War, free riding should have mattered less 
because there existed no major, nuclear-armed threat for NATO to deter. Moreover, the 
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structure of European military forces today is itself the legacy of grand bargains struck 
during the Cold War. Major American allies like West Germany did not want to take the 
free ride implied in the American nuclear security guarantees they received. Instead, they 
sought nuclear weapons, thereby provoking the United States into mounting coercive 
counterproliferation efforts against some of its own allies. Simply put, states take 
seriously their own security and choose not to depend on the kindness of others as a first 
resort. 
 In Central-Eastern Europe at least, we again see key NATO allies boosting their 
military capabilities to counteract the threat Russia now poses as a result of its actions in 
Ukraine. These states are not strictly relying on the patronage of the United States as 
expected by those who worry that under-contributing leads to strategic paralysis. To be 
sure, they want, and even ask for more, American military support. This desire is 
understandable: though they benefit from the Article 5 commitment that NATO offers, 
they do not host the physical trappings of American extended deterrence as their Western 
European counterparts do. Still, the states that feel threatened by Russia have expanded, 
or intend on expanding, their military budgets. Lithuania even introduced military 
conscription. Germany may be at the crossroads in its defense policy. Ironically, in the 
case of Poland and the Baltic countries, these countries do face strong incentives to pass 
the costs of security onto the United States. Owing to their small size relative to the 
United States, these states cannot either individually or collectively deter Russia 
conventionally. And yet their defense policies are assuming a character that suggests that 
they are not so entrusting of the United States so as to depend too much on it. 
If arguments about free riding allies are wrong, especially when we consider 
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contributions via defense expenditures, then why do they remain popular? This question 
is a matter of conjecture, but several answers are possible. One is that it is the by-product 
of American leaders repeatedly encouraging allies to do more for their defense and thus 
relieve the United States of its extensive military commitments around the world. The 
rhetoric, once intended to encourage allies into doing their part, has taken a life of its own. 
It even has an analogue in American domestic politics whereby recipients of social 
assistance are seen as lazy but exploitative ‘welfare queens’ who need to be cut off in 
order to force them back to work. Nevertheless, it appears disingenuous when we 
consider past American efforts to deny allies those nuclear capabilities that would allow 
the United States to retract its military commitments abroad. American leaders thus only 
want their allies to do more for their defense up until a certain point. Another possibility 
is that the slogan of free riding allies is consistent with the view that international security 
and stability are largely due to the exertions of the United States. That allies do not fully 
trust the United States complicates the belief that it is an unquestionable force for good in 
the world. Allies might want the United States to maintain a global presence and attend to 
their security needs, but they are attuned to the vagaries of international politics so as not 
to take it for granted.     
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